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Antidiscrimination Laws & Artistic Expression
STEVEN SHIFFRIN AND GREGORY R. SMITH
Can antidiscrimination laws be extend-
ed to those who appear on screen? Can
a white actor be rejected fI a black
role on the basis of race, when makeup
would be sufficient to make him appear
black'? Can a broadcaster be legally
compelled to hire a woman to play a
male role when, properly disguised, she
can appear to be male? Can a pregnant
actress insist on playing a sex vixen,
when clever shooting and body doubles
can successfully hide her pregnancy'?'
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, it is generally an unlawful
employment practice to discriminate
against a person on the basis of racc,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
State law is typically similar. Thus,
for example, in California, the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEt-A),
at Government Code section 12940,
makes it "an unlawful employment
practice, unless based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification, ... [qor an
employer, because of the race, ....
color, .... or sex of any person, to refuse
to hire ... or to discharge the person
from employment ...."
Title VII, FEHA, or equivalent pro-
visions found elsewhere in federal and
state law have been used by employees
to state claims for discrimination based
on gender,2 pregnancy,' race,4 physical
condition,' and age.' It has been stated
that "public policy ... is to prohibit
harassment and discrimination in
employment on the basis of any pro-
tected classification."'
Against these statutes must be set
the principle that speech designed to
entertain has historically been protected
under the First Amendment.' As the
Court observed in Buwro'n, it cannot be
doubted that communications designed
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to entertain, such as motion pictures,
"are a significant medium for the com-
munication of ideas. They may affect
public attitudes and behavior in a vari-
ety of ways, ranging from direct
espousal of a politici, doctrine to the
subtle shaping of thought which char-
acterizes all artistic expression."''
It is equally well established under
the U.S. Constitution that editors have
the authority to make decisions about
content without government interfer-
ence. Thus the Supreme Court has
warned against "intrusion into the func-
tion of editors""' and has recognized
that, "for better or for worse, editing is
what editors are for." ' As the court
said in Olivia N., "Applied to the elec-
tronic media, the First Amendment
means that it is the broadcaster that has
',te authority to make programming
decisions."' 2
Obviously, the entertainment indus-
try can have no general claim to immu-
nity from antidiscrimination laws. It has
no right to take race, or age, or gender
into account in hiring writers, stage
crew, costumers, or makeup artists. But
may it take such otherwise protected
classifications into account in hiring and
firing on-screen actors and actresses'?
Hiurlev v. h'ish-Amer'ican Gay Les-
bian and Bisexual Gi'aup afBoston''
suggests that the First Amendment
should trump antidiscrimination laws
when substantial free speech interests
are present. In tholev, Massachusetts,
pursuant to a public accommodations
statute prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, required
the private organizers of the St.
Patrick's Day parade in Boston to
include a group that the organizers had
wished to exclude. The organizers
maintained that the application of this
antidiscrimination statute violated their
First Amendment rights; but the lower
courts concluded, among other things,
that the First Amendment was not vio-
lated because the parade contained no
particularized message. The Supreme
Court held that no particularized mes-
sage was required:
IT~he (onstitution looks beyond %% ritten or
spoken words as mediums of'expression....
Symbolism is a primitise but eftctise way of
expressing ideas .... 'A] narrowN succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of con-
sututiotal protection, which if confined to
expressions conveyving a particularized mes-
sage .. would neer reach the unquestion-
ably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock.
music of Arnold Schonberg, or Jabberwocky
verse of Lewis Carroll.
Even more important, the Court
unanimously upheld the organizers'
right to determine which contingents
would or would not march in the
parade:
[The organizers'] claim to the benefits of
[the] principle of autonomy to control one's
speech is as sound as the South Boston
parade is expressive. Rather like a composer.
the Council selects the expressie units of the
parade from potential participants, and
though the score may not produce a particu-
larized message, each contingent's expression
in the Council's eyes comports with what
merits celebration on that day."'
The Court stated that the free speech
right to autonomy was engaged even if
its analogy to a composer gave the
Council credit for a more considered
judgment than it actually made. Similar-
ly, it can be argued that television and
movie producers. like the organizers of
a parade, should be allowed to select the
members of their ensembles on the
basis of their appearance, in order to
produce the expression they desire."
This point is reinforced by tar't v.
Cult Awareness Network. 7 The court
concluded that the Cult Awareness Net-
work, a group formed to monitor cults
and educate the public about their
harmful effects, had a First Amend-
ment right, and a right under the Cali-
fornia constitution, to exclude a mem-
ber of the Church of Scientology, even
if the Unruh Civil Rights Act were
applicable. The applicant entertained
views that were different from the Cult
Awareness Network, and the court
found a "substantial basis" in the record
for the conclusion that admission of the
applicant as well as other Scientologists
would impede its ability to disseminate
its preferred view." The antidiscrimi-
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nation statute was trumped by the First
Amendment interest.'"
In a similar vein the Washington
Supreme Court held an antidiscrimina-
tion statute unconstitutional as applied
to a claim of free press. Washington's
Fair Campaign Practices Act prohibits
employers from discriminating against
employees for their political activity.
The News Tribune transferred an
employee from her position as educa-
tion reporter to that of swing shift copy
editor because she had been politically
active. The reporter sued, maintaining
that the Act barred such discrimination,
and the Washington Supreme Court
agreed.2( Nonetheless, the court held
the statute was unconstitutional as
applied to the News Tribune. The court
stated that "editorial integrity and cred-
ibility are core objectives of editorial
control and thus merit protection under
the free press clause." 21 "if a newspaper
cannot be required to publish a particu-
lar reporter's work, how can it be con-
stitutionally required to employ the
individual as a reporter?" 22 The court
concluded: "Choosing an editorial staff
is a core press function, at least when
that choice is based on editorial consid-
erations."23
The same analysis ought to apply to
on-screen performers-choosing the
ensemble of actors and actresses of a
television production is a core editorial
function. If an antidiscrimination
statute cannot constitutionally be
applied on behalf of reporters for their
off-the-job activities (which cannot be
seen in the pages of the newspaper),
such a statute ought not constitutionally
to be applicable to compel producers to
hire, or to continue to employ, persons
in protected classifications where
appearance is deemed by the producer
to be relevant.
There are, of course, numerous
cases where antidiscrimination laws
have been used to open up clubs and
associations. None of these cases, how-
ever, involved any serious claim of
expressive (as contrasted with associa-
tional) rights. The seminal case involv-
ing clubs and associations is Roberts v.
UnitedJaycees.24 The national organi-
zation of Jaycees sought to sanction
local Jaycees in Minnesota for admit-
ting women. The Minnesota Depart-
ment of Human Rights ruled that any
imposition of sanctions would violate
the state's prohibition of gender dis-
crimination in places ofpublic acconm-
modations. The Jacees argued that tile
department's ruling violated tihe First
Amendnlent.
The Supreme Court in Roberts con-
cluded that the Jaycees "'aiiled to
demonstrate that the Act imposes any
serious burdens on tile male members'
freedom of expressive association' 2"
and also concluded that there was no
basis in the record lor the claim that
admission of women would "impede
the organization's ability to disseminate
its preferred views. '2 7 Significantly, the
Roberts court noted that the Act
imposed "no restriction on the organi-
zation's ability to exclude individuals
with ideologies or nhilosophies differ-
ent from its existing members.""2h
The cases following Roberts simi-
larly do not involve subs;tanlial cl1 imis
of expressive rights. New )ork''ate
Club Associations v. ('t of Nn'ew )ork'
upheld a facial challenge to New York
City's antidiscrimination law as applied
to clubs deemed to be public. Tihe court
observed that some associations might
be able to make a showing that their
expressive rights were violated, but no
showing appeared in the record about
any of the clubs covered by the law.
Board o'Directotw of Rotary Interna-
lional. upheld the sex discrimination
aspects of the Unruh Act as applied to
Rotary Clubs, finding that the Rotary's
protected service activities would likely
be strengthened, not weakened, and
suggesting in dictum that any slight
impact would be justified. Itishon v.
King & Spauhiing,' a sex discrimina-
tion case in which a woman sought to
be considered as a partner in a law
firm, found no indication that tile law
firin's ability to fulfill expressive func-
tions would be inhibited by considera-
tion of the petitioner for partnership on
her merits. l('arfiehl v. )eninmda Go/f
and Lotunrt' C'ub invalidated sex dis-
crimination by a golf'and country club,
noting there was "no appreciable effect
on it,; members' freedom of expressive
association." Finally, in Bohemian('lu v. l./Il 0 the Bohemian Club
sought to overturn an order requiring it
to cease its practice of refusing to con-
sider women for employment. Tile
court of appeal upheld the order against
a First Amendment attack based on
rights of intimate association. It specifi-
cally stated, however, that it "need not
address the question of whether the
Club's 'expressive' right of association
would be infringed because the thrust
of'the Club's argument is that the pres-
ence of \,omen would destroy tile inti-
mate all-male atmosphere."
Roberts does contain dictum that
infringement on the rights to associate
for expressive purposes can be justified
by compelling state interests, unrelated
to tile expression of ideas, that cannot
be achieved through means significant-
ly less restrictive of associational free-
doms. That language, however, was in
the context of clubs and associations
where the members;' views were not
diflerent firom those of the association.
So understood, the chance of a signifi-
cant impact oil expressive association
would be slight. Ally broader reading
of the Roberts dictumn would seem to be
foreclosed by the unanimous ruling in
IIIrlev. In commenting oil the clubs
and association cases, the Court iil /hr-
le' made it clear that antidiscrimination
laws seeking to open up clubs and asso-
ciations must give way if enforcing
them would "trespass on the organiza-
tion's message." .4
Taken together, these cases strongly
indicate that on-screen performances
cannot constitutionally be included
within the scope of antidiscrimination
laws, and that producers cannot be
required by antidiscrimination statutes
to select and use actors and actresses
whose appearances are not in their
view right for the part, or would require
alterations in filming and presentation
which impact their subjective artistic
judgment.Y5
No arm of the government, whether
the legislature, the judge, or the jury,
ought to be able to override these
expressive choices. Tile producers right
to control the casting process ----"to tai-
lor tile speech" -- ought to be protected
by the First Amendment.
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